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Abstract: The transposition of the cultural, religious, and sacred onto physical
geographies is practiced by humans everywhere as landscapes are canvases for meaning making
and integral placeholders of histories. In the Indian context, this practice is distinct for several
reasons. Scholars of Hindu traditions recognize that the place-oriented disposition and centrality
of land to Hindu traditions and cultures is unprecedented and integral to identity formation in
modern India. As India faces increasing environmental degradation, the preservation of “sacred
geographies” is especially crucial to the identity of Hindu traditions. The rise of Hindu
nationalist (Hindutva) political parties (e.g., the Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP) has heavily
influenced the mapping of landscape as distinctly Hindu. By analyzing contemporary
environmental movements in India and delineating Hindu nationalist histories and contemporary
politics, this project claims that environmental work politicizes the landscape through a Hindutva
framework in ways that shape environmentalism to prioritize geographical features tied to
imagined Hindu pasts and futures that further a Hindu nationalist agenda.
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On August 15, 1947 India partitioned into two independent states: Hindu-majority India
and Muslim-majority Pakistan. Partition marked the independence of India from British rule, but
along with decolonization came the process of bifurcation that required mass migration to fulfill
the normative goal of creating Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority states as these populations
did not clearly reside in the boundaries drawn by partition. The strife of mass migration spurred
by the declaration of partition resulted in an estimated several hundred thousand deaths as
millions of Muslims fled to the newly created Pakistan, and millions of Hindus and Sikhs to
India.1 Partition has been analyzed in terms of the two-nation theory, namely that Muslim and
Hindu were the two primary identities in pre-Independence India which resulted in the founding
of two nations that placed religion as the defining factor of nationality.2 While the creation of
India and Pakistan normatively relied on religious difference, the intention was not to create
religious states, particularly in the case of India.
Since partition, India has existed as a secular state and is today the world’s largest
democracy consisting of 1.3 billion people with 80% of the population identifying as Hindu.3 In
the country’s constitution, the Preamble states: “We the people of India, having solemnly
resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic and to secure
4

to all its citizens…” Furthermore, India’s first prime minister and eminent figure in the

The estimated number of deaths from Partition is highly contested and political. The generally
accepted range is between two-hundred thousand and two million casualties. This estimate falls
on the lower side, see Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and
History in India. 1st ed. Vol. 7. (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 68.
2
For more on the two-nation theory and how it fueled and grew thoeretically out of Indian
partition, see Shaukatullah Ansari. Pakistan - the Problem of India (New Delhi: Commonwealth
Public, 1997)
3
Conrad Hackett . Population Growth of the World’s Largest Religions in India: Pew Research
Center, 2015.
4
[Amendment] Constitution of India. Amend. XLII. Sec 2.
1
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independence movement, Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke on the matter: “We talk about a secular state
in India…. Some people think it means something opposed to religion. That obviously is not
correct… it is a state which honours all faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities.”5
Despite the foundation of secularity during the process of statecraft, currents of Hindu
nationalism have been central to the construction of modern India as an independent state.
Today, when looking at the Hindu nationalist rhetoric utilized by the nation’s ruling party, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) it is hard to decipher what being “secular” means to the people of
India. A clear hierarchy of religious dispositions occupies the public sphere in a way that many
feel contradicts and compromises the secularity of the state as articulated in the constitution and
stands as an antithesis to Nehruvian Secularism, and the egalitarian intentions of independent
India regarding religious difference.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is emblematic of the threat to secularism and represents
the contradiction of a constitutionally secular state being governed by a religiously affiliated
party. As a member of the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, he carries religious ideals and dogma
into the political arena in very overt ways. The party practices Hindutva,6 or “Hinduness”, which,
in short, conflates Indian identity and selfhood as inherently Hindu.7 Over the past several
decades, as Hindutva becomes increasingly affiliated with state politics, the rhetoric is also

Lucinda Ramberg, Given to the Goddess (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press,
2014), 14.
6
The term Hindutva was coined in the 1920’s by an incarcerated Hindu politician who was
writing in the context of British Imperialism and understood Hindutva to be a central political
tool to unify the Indian, namely Hindu, population to overthrow the Raj. See Vinayak Damodar
Savarkar, Hindutva; Who is a Hindu? (Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969)
7
Jyotirmaya Sharma, Hindutva: Exploring the Idea of Hindu Nationalism (New Delhi: Penguin
Books, 2003)
5
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becoming commonplace in everyday language in India. The rise of Hindutva works bilaterally: it
is being carried out in very overt ways by the federal government under the leadership of Modi,
but it is also perpetuated by a majority of the population that has come to identify with these
political positions. Thus, both government and citizen actors co-create contemporary Hindutva
sentiments and contribute to the polyvocality of Hindu nationalism in contemporary India.8
While there are many ways in which Hindutva politics are played out in the Indian
government and in the public sphere, an increasingly urgent concern for Hindu nationalists is the
“natural”9 environmental — a concern that is articulated through a distinct discourse of
environmentalism. Environmental work, akin to other contemporary issues in India, is not
exempt from the mark of Hindutva. To make sense of this relationship between Hindutva and
contemporary environmental discourse (and action), I examine the nuances of the BJP’s political
rhetoric specific to environmental campaigns in India (e.g., the Namami Ganga campaign) in
light of broader discussion related to religion and ecology and sacred geographies in India. I
argue that in contemporary India, Hindutva has entered the realm of environmental work, uniting
religious nationalism with the “progressive” goal of local climate change activism. More
broadly, as India is ruled under an ideology of Hindu nationalism the landscape of the

To clarify, I am stating that the rising of Hindutva is not a political ideology solely
disseminated from the government to the people, rather it is something that works
bi-directionally and dialectically between the government and people. Like any democracy, the
Indian electorate elects their officials and the political views of the elected officials correspond to
the interests of the people. Akin to other political ideologies, it does not disseminate from a
singular voice, but is a polyvocal product reflecting a large mass of ideas, voices, and politics.
9
“Natural” and “nature” are understood as very fluid, multivalent nouns in the context of this
project. In the environmental humanities, the terms “natural” and “nature” are often placed in
quotations because they are understood as highly constructed and representative of a somewhat
non-existent, or unattainable reality. In this case, “nature” is understood to have a close relation
to Hindutva and to a certain extent Hindutva is understood as “natural” to the subcontinent.
8
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subcontinent is politicized in exclusionary ways that articulate a sense of Hindu territoriality over
the land. This political rhetoric has fundamentally shaped how environmental work is
conceptualized in India. Therefore, while Hindu nationalist-inspired environmentalism attempts
to serve the end of protecting the environment and mitigating ecological destruction, it also
transforms environmental work into a method of advancing the Hindutva political agenda.
The convoluted interplay of Hindu nationalist politics, ecology, and religion is a core axis
of this thesis. The phrase “Hindu nationalist ecology” will serve as a metonym for the complex
relationship between contemporary environmentalism and Hindu nationalism. With the use of
this term, I seek to illuminate the ways in which Hindu nationalist rhetoric espouse Hindu
cultural supremacy and consciously and unconsciously weaves a Hindu nationalist worldview
into ecological initiatives. Hindu nationalist ecologies illustrate how the impact of Hindu
nationalism pervades more than electoral gains and manifestations of communalism, but also as
an ideology manifesting on a more macro level in the form of environmental political discourse.
Additionally, this term reflects the political goal to demarcate the land as belonging to imagined
Hindu histories and futures. By laying claim to certain ecologies they simultaneously posit the
dominance of Hindu nationalism; therefore, “Hindu nationalist ecology” takes on a meaning of a
Hindu right to the land.
Methodology
As a student of both religious studies and of environmental studies, I came to this project
seeking to incorporate work from both disciplines. I locate my project in the context of India,
specifically Northern India. In part this is due to the significance of North India’s widely
acknowledged sacred geographical sites, including the Ganges River and the city of Varanasi
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which lend themselves to my consideration of how environmentalism and mythical histories of
the landscape are intertwined in robust ways.10 Additionally, India is a nation central to any
discussion of global climate change given its immense population and position as a developing
nation. The goal of this capstone is not, however, to interrogate the degree to which India as a
nation or “Hinduism” as a religion are ecologically friendly, or to serve as a mere critique of
Hindu nationalism. Rather, the goal is, on the one hand, to illuminate how Hindu nationalist
narratives are used as rhetorical and discursive tools to enact environmental initiatives and on the
other hand, to question how environmental work is used as a vehicle to further a Hindutva
agenda.11 More specifically, I will examine how Hindu nationalist ideology has taken up the
“ecological question” and posed it in terms of purity and pollution of specific features of the
natural landscape as well as the purity of the culture of the nation. The core question guiding my
project is: How have contemporary environmental campaigns in India been shaped by Hindu
nationalist rhetoric and furthermore what are the implications of using communalist language in
taking up the ecological question?

The Ganges River Basin is referred to by some as the cultural and political hearth of the
nation. See Sya Buryn Kedzior, "Ganga: The Benevolent Purifier Under Siege." Nidan 26, no. 2
(December, 2014): 21.
11
I do not find myself in a position to subscribe a solution to or directly address the formation of
a Hindu nationalist ecology, however I do think the implications of the phenomenon lie in
underpinnings of xenophobia and cultural supremacy. My project seeks to illuminate that,
however given my positionality as a white cis-male Western-educated student who is removed
geographically from this particular context in India, I do not find myself in a position to speak
for or on behalf of those belonging to Hindu nationalist ideology or conversely those who do not
fit into the normative vision of the Indian nation as posited by Hindutva.
10
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This project is informed by the conceptual framework of Lynn White’s “The Historical
Roots of our Ecologic Crisis” (1967), which posits the concept of “religion and ecology.”12 This
term introduces the idea that religion and religious dispositions can be utilized in a way to
advocate for environmental amelioration and sustainable practice. However, research on
contemporary environmental campaigns in India altered my understanding of religion and
ecology fundamentally. While Hindu nationalists are advocating for environmental work through
a “religion and ecology” framework, namely using religious texts, practice, and beliefs to support
environmental work, the form of religion and ecology in India takes on another dimension: that
of Hindu cultural superiority and communalism.
The crucial dimension of Hindu nationalism in religion and ecology discourses in India
transitioned my primary focus from one of religion and ecology to one that places primacy on
political discourse in contemporary India, specifically the development of Hindu nationalist
ideology and its relation to land.13 Focusing on a contemporary phenomenon, I have drawn from
historical materials that inform how a contemporary Hindu nationalist ecology has formed and
continually evolves.
One of the few scholars who interrogates the connection between Hindu nationalism and
environmentalism is Mukul Sharma, an award-winning New Delhi-based journalist-authoractivist. Due to the limited scholarship on the topic, this project is heavily informed by the work
of Mukul Sharma’s book Green and Saffron: Hindu Nationalism and Indian Environmental
The concept term “religion and ecology” is developed in Whites’ work and he is seen as the
founder of religion and ecology, which is now a highly interdisciplinary field of study. Lynn
White, "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis," Science 155, no. 3767 (1967): 1203-1207
13
I do not intend to conflate Hindutva with “Hinduism” and therefore, I move away from a direct
analysis rooted in religion and ecology. The focus transitions to discursive political analysis that
is rooted in Hindutva deployments of Hindu religious scriptures and histories.
12
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Politics (2012).14 Sharma’s work focuses on how right-wing organizations have taken green
perspectives and developed environmental politics, namely how biological and ecological
justifications and right-wing politics act reciprocally to support one another. He focuses on India
because of his familiarity with contemporary India and because he sees India as a clear example
of how right-wing environmentalism has emerged on the global stage. My project is akin to
Sharma’s work in that it similarly looks at Hindu nationalism and a development of an
environmental politic. However, unlike Sharma, I focus my research through a religion and
ecology framework and elucidate how sacred geographies act as a core force in these
discussions. Additionally, I focus on the BJP specifically. Furthermore, the vast range of sources
that I have considered here — ranging from sociology of religion to environmental discourse—
offer a distinct set of background sources from those Sharma engages with.
Given the geographically situated nature of this project and the varying perspectives and
disciplinary backgrounds that it draws upon, I conceptualize my capstone as grounded in cultural
studies.15 Therefore, methodologically speaking, my project is dynamic and interdisciplinary and
recognizes how political, religious, environmental and cultural lenses are not discrete, but are
rather entwined and act in relation to one another to construct the worlds we create and inhabit.
Another crucial tenet of my methodological approach is the importance of the construction of
place on both temporal and spatial axes. Situated in contemporary India, this project arises out of
a particular social and historical context which informs the place, a core aspect of cultural

seemingly small field of scholars focusing on Hindu nationalist environmental politics
served as an advantage because it allowed me to posit an original argument. A difficulty of the
lack of scholarship on the subject is that I had few voices to draw from and synthesis.
15
Credit to Professor Margaret Kamitsuka who identified and put a name to the methodological
approach of my project. See "Cultural Studies," last modified August 8, 2016,
https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/cultural-studies., accessed March 7, 2018.
14

The
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studies.16 The “situatedness” of this project to use the words of Donna Haraway, provide more
nuanced, accurate claims as opposed to universal and objective claims.17 Employing the situated
approach, I am careful to introduce the reader to the rich, nuanced milieu in which a Hindu
nationalist ecology has formed before performing a discursive analysis of Hindutva political
rhetoric.
Outline
This capstone begins with a section titled, “Religion and Ecology”, which acts as a
theoretical frame for this capstone, positing that religion and religious worldviews can contribute
to environmental discourse. Discussion of Lynn White’s “The Historical Roots of our Ecological
Crisis” (1967) occupies a majority of the section, where I present a core conceptual argument
that religious beliefs influence how humans treat the non-human world. This concept is
examined in the context of a praxis that has arisen in more contemporary environmental thought
as a potential paradigm to reorient human conceptualizations of the environment. This section
provides crucial framing for my examination of the connection between Hindu religious
worldviews and environmentalism.
In the following section, “Hinduism and Ecology,” I hone in on the importance of
physical landscape in Hindu traditions. Diana Eck’s India: A Sacred Geography (2011) offers a
robust historical analysis that examines how Indian sacredness is not grafted on to India by

 n aspect of cultural studies that I find Implicit to my project is an analysis of power. I do not
A
investigate overtly the power dynamics between Hindu and other non-Hindu religious groups in
India, but the topic is implicit in discussions of communalism and the political power of Hindu
nationalist dating back to pre-independent India.
17
Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege
of Partial Perspective," in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (NY:
Routledge, 1991), 191.
16
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western scholars, but is rather central to India’s mythological understanding of the nation. Eck
traces the history of sacredness back millenniums to demonstrate how the sacrality of the Indian
soil is not a new phenomenon. I introduce Eck’s research to illuminate the importance of
religious dispositions and Hindu cultural histories in the understanding of the land in India; or in
other words, how the land is sacredly legitimized and conceptualized. I then move on to the work
of another prominent contemporary Hindu studies scholar, David Haberman, who examines in
his book, River of Love in an Age of Pollution: The Yamuna River of North India (2006), the
tension between ideas of religious purity of the river and the reality of an exceedingly polluted
river. Haberman deploys a religion and ecology framework to examine how premodern texts and
Hindu mythological stories interact with efforts to protect to ecology of the river today.
In the “Hinduism and Ecology” section, the discussion moves beyond a mere analytical
framework that explicates the relationship between Hindu traditions and connections to the land.
The work of Eck and Haberman provide a crucial antecedent to understanding how the sacred
nature of the Indian soil is used and politicized by right-wing Hindu nationalists. To illustrate the
ties between territory and religion I look at Indian sacred geographies and contemporary
Hindutva politics to examine the so-called Ram Janmabhumi (“birthplace of Lord Ram)
movement. Starting in the 1980’s, this movement mobilized Hindu nationalists political leaders
and their sympathizers to demolish a 16th-century mosque and to reclaim the location as what
they believed to be the birthplace of the popular Hindu deity Ram. The Ram Janmabhumi
movement transitions the capstone from an analysis of sacred geographies and religion and
ecology frameworks to a more focused discursive analysis of the environmental politics of the
contemporary Bharatiya Janata Party. My goal here is to demonstrate how acts of communal
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violence are not disparate from a BJP environmental politic given that they rely on the same
theoretical underpinnings of a Hindu cultural supremacy.
In the following section, “Hindu Nationalism and a Formation of an Environmental
Politic,” I further integrate the relationality between environmental work and Hindu nationalist
ideologies. I introduce the metonymic terms green (read: environmental/ecology) and saffron
(read: Hindutva) and delineate their interrelatedness. Mukul Sharma’s research is central to this
section as his work developed the use of these metonymic terms and furthermore provides a
nuanced analysis as to how “green and saffron” are co-creators in contemporary Indian politics
and have come to rely on one another in the formation of a Hindu nationalist ecology. I
re-introduce the term “Hindutva” and its complex historical significance beginning under the
British Raj to its communal connotations todays. I seek to illuminate how Hindutva ideology in
many ways follows the narrative of sacred geographies by linking the Hindu people to the land
of India, positing that the land of India as one for Hindus only. Or, in other words that Hindus are
“natural” to the landscape. This proposition is used by Hindu nationalists through the language
of sacred legitimation linking cultural purity with ecological purity.
In the final section, “Greening of Saffron: Contemporary Environmentalism in India” I
analyze the BJP’s 2014 Election Manifesto and the National Mission for a Clean Ganga
Campaign (Namami Gange) to further illuminate not only the formation, but also the practice of
a Hindu nationalist ecology. In some respects, the campaigns that inform this discussion are my
core primary sources and the discursive analysis and historical background the comes prior
develops the argument and provides a framework for analyzing the campaigns. I examine the
rhetorical devices of these campaigns to support my argument with empirical evidence.

13

In pursuit of my primary question for this project — how have contemporary
environmental campaigns in India been shaped by Hindu nationalist rhetoric and furthermore
what are the implications of using communalist language in taking up the ecological question?
— each section of the capstone contributes to my observations on Hindu nationalist ecologies.
Hindu nationalism has forged a bond with Indian environmental politics. More specifically,
Hindu nationalist ecologies politicize the landscape of the subcontinent in exclusionary ways that
articulates a sense of a Hindu belonging to the land. While the environmental campaigns of the
BJP are received in vastly different ways than explicit instances of communal violence that often
make headlines, Hindu nationalist ecologies are, I maintain, a manifestation of a similar
communal nature of Hindutva politics on a macro level of environment-political discourse.
Religion and Ecology
Environmentalism is often regarded as a set of concerns and actions that use scientific
methods to address environmental degradation. According to dominant paradigms in
environmental studies, if scientific advancement, the Industrial Revolution, and development of
fossil-fuel burning technologies aided to create our current crisis, then science could supply
answers, helping to mitigate our ecological crisis. However, approaches to environmental work
are highly diverse and interdisciplinary, and perspectives from humanities serve a vital role. In
studying the environment, the understanding that the non-human world does not stand alone, but
rather fundamentally entwined with and can only be understood in relation to economics, culture,
and religion is essential.
I am especially concerned with how religion is positioned in relationship to the
non-human world, and how approaching religion and ecology might allow us to think about the
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environmental crisis that in a way that moves beyond merely examining the effects of our human
consumption, to examining more broadly the ways in which humans conceptualize the
environment to begin with. I am furthermore interested in what it means to approach the
ecological question as a religious question that seeks religious answers. While using religion as
a tool to combat environmental degradation is not prevalent in mainstream environmentalist
movements, the approach has idea has garnered some attention over the past several decades. As
early as 1987, for instance, the United Nations published a report entitled Our Common Future,
which poses religion as a possible solution to the environmental crisis stating:
Sustainable development requires changes in values and attitudes towards the
environment and development requires changes in values and attitudes towards
environment and development- indeed, towards society and work at home, on farms, and
in factories. The world’s religions could help provide direction and motivation in forming
new values that would stress individual and joint responsibility towards the environment
18
and towards nurturing harmony between humanity and environment.
The United Nations declaration that religion “could help provide direction and motivation in
forming new values” towards the environment is not as concrete as calling for the
implementation of renewable energy, or a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions; rather it posits
that religious frameworks are fundamental in conceptualizing one’s world and that religious
worldviews play a major role in shaping human attitudes toward the natural environment.
Religion can function as a solution that seeks to change the way humans conceptualize and
therefore interact with the environment. This articulates my core conceptual argument that
religious worldviews influence particular beliefs, practices, and interactions regarding the
nonhuman world. This argument will be applied specifically to the contemporary rhetoric of a
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987): 95.
18
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Hindu nationalist ecology to discern how in this situated context religion and environmental
work are intertwined.
Lynn White, a scholar of medieval Christianity, examines the field of study that first
considered the relationships between religion and ecology in a 1967 edition of Science Magazine
titled “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis.” His contentious argument in Science
Magazine fostered an emergent discourse around the relationship between religious studies and
19

environmental studies. Studying Western Christianity’s development of scientific technology in
20

the Medieval period, White critiques Christianity’s relationship to the environment. Religion
has the power of shaping our worlds— from the way humans conceptualize the forest to what
happens to a human after death. White believes this shapes our ecology: “What people do about
their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them.
Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny — that is, by
21

religion”. White articulates a foundational idea to the field of religion and ecology— that
religious beliefs influence human treatment of the natural world; therefore, our problem is
foundationally a philosophical problem.
On a metaphysical level, White’s interpretation of Christianity articulates that it is a
religion of dominion, which can be seen in the very act of humans naming all the animals to

White’s thesis is prevalent in any work on religion and ecology. While his argument regarding
Christianity as the “most anthropocentric religion” (1205) is contested, his thesis that religious
worldviews influence our conceptualization of the natural world is widely accepted and is the
cornerstone of religion and ecology. See Lynn White, "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic
Crisis," Science 155, no. 3767 (1967): 1203-1207.
20
The very nature of White’s approach in using the term “Western Christianity” is devoid of
context and he writes on behalf of the whole faith which is problematic. Nonetheless his
scholarship has merits in that it highlights main dogmatic doctrines that illicit poor ecological
consciousness.
21
White, “The Historical Roots,” 1207.
19
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establish dominance over them. More specifically, White argues that environmental
degradation grew out of Western technological and scientific advancements made by Christian
societies in the Medieval period. Beyond this, he proclaims that Christianity is the “most
23

anthropocentric religion in the world.” While White’s thesis has been subject to many debates,
the tenet that continues to be central to scholarship in religion and ecology is that all religious
conceptions (cosmology, ethics, parables) do fundamentally influence human’s relation to the
nonhuman world. White, similarly to the United Nations Our Common Future report concludes
by suggesting that “more science and more technology are not going to get us out the present
24

ecological crisis until we find a new religion, or re-think our old one.”

White sees the problem of how our modern ecological crisis as fundamentally a
philosophical problem of how humans view the natural world. Thus, the problem of prioritizing
humans over “nature” and degradation will not be solved by new science and technology:
humans must rather adequately re-orient their relations to the nonhuman world. Because
Christianity was the initial subject studied by White and others’ criticism in the burgeoning field
of religion and ecology, some have assumed that the lack of discussion around non-Christian
religions, particularly Asian and Native American traditions, indicate that he assumes that these
traditions posit environmental neutrality, or that they construct inherently less detrimental
worldviews and practices.

25

Contrasting Christianity’s destruction of European Paganism, its predecessor White states, “By
destroying pagan animism, Christianity made is possible to exploit nature in a mood of
indifference to the feelings of natural objects.” Ibid., 1204.
23
Ibid., 1205.
24
Ibid., 1207.
25
I return to this point later in the capstone. Examples of those who contest White’s formulations
include, J. Baird Callicott ‘A NeoPresocratic Manifesto’, Environmental Humanities, 2 (2013):
169–186; Mary Evelyn Tucker, ‘Religion and Ecology: Survey of the Field’, in Gottlieb, R. S.
22
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More recently, however, the field of religion and ecology has engaged with all of the
world’s major religions. Theologians and activists who agree with the inherent connections
between religious and ecological disposition are engaging in efforts to rethink current traditions
and formulate new understanding of human’s relationship with the nonhuman world in light of
the ecological crisis.26 The work to engage with the environmental crisis utilizing religious
frameworks is known as the “greening of religion.”
Those who work to “green” religion, posit that religion has the potential to mitigate our
environmental crisis and that religious actions can be grounded in environmentally conscious
beliefs. Therefore, the greening of religion allows some practitioners to critically reflect on and
re-interpret their practice vis-a-vis an ecological perspective. The greening of religion often
manifests in the application of a “green hermeneutic” to sacred texts. This so-called greening of
religion is not, however, so simple. No single religious tradition is independently equipped with
the tools to solve our current environmental crisis. As Poul Pedersen states, “No Buddhist,
Hindu, or Islamic scriptures contain concepts like ‘environmental crisis,’ ‘ecosystems,’ or
‘sustainable development,’ or concepts corresponding to them. To insist that they do is to deny
the immense cultural distance that separates traditional religious concepts of the environment
27

from modern ecological knowledge.” According to Pederson, efforts to “green religion” start

(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006):
398–418. To see a large overview as to how White’s thesis has reverberated in the fields of
environmentalism, medieval studies, and religion and ecology, see, Elspeth Whitney. "Lynn
White Jr.'s ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’ After 50 Years," History Compass 13,
no. 8 (August, 2015): 396-410.
26
See, for example: Sarah McFarland Taylor, Green Sisters: A Spiritual Ecology (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2009) or the work of the Sankat Mochan Foundation in Varanasi,
India.
27
Poul Pedersen, "Nature, Religion, and Cultural Identity: The Religious Environmental
Paradigm," Asian Perceptions of Nature (1995): 262. Pederson also cautions us to avoid
18

with the conviction; that scriptures do not prescribe how to respond to the ecological strife, but
that ecological ethics must be construed through hermeneutical readings of texts.
An example of such a “green” reading can be seen in the work of Lance E. Nelson, a
Hindu studies and ecology scholar, who applied a green hermeneutic to a reading of the classical
Hindu text, the Bhagavadgita. Nelson believes that as our ecological crisis heightens, “We
cannot avoid the need to examine the fundamentals of religious worldviews to determine their
impact on ecology. This means that the basic categories and deep structures— along with
28

primary scriptures— cannot remain immune from the questioning process.” Nelson’s reading
of the Bhagavadgita highlights perspectives that could lend significant support for ecological
consciousness. However, his reading also could be received as highly problematic to some
Hindus because the application of a green hermeneutic relies not solely on finding ecological
positives of a text, but also reinterpreting or reconstructing a text in light of the ecological.
Therefore, constructing such green hermeneutics is potentially contentious. Furthermore, linking
scriptural interpretations to environmental activism often conceptualizes the work within a
particular religious worldview which may not agree with others beyond one’s own religious
tradition.
Often religious-motivated environmental activism occurs with, and in conversation with,
the re-conceptualization of scriptural sources. In March 1973 in the north Himalayan village of
Gopeshwar, for instance, plots of land were being auctioned off to logging contractors. When

conflating values and norms as directly determining behavior. Humans are complex and values
and norms do not always translate into behavior that reflects those values, therefore it is
important to compare how values and behaviors correspond.
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loggers came to cut down the trees, the local people protested. Deforestation in the region was
already compromising the lifestyle of local residents as firewood and other subsistently harvested
resources were eradicated by logging companies. The locals, a group of adivasis29 (indigenous
peoples), began to hug the trees to prevent the lumber workers from logging. This came to be
30

known as the Chipko movement (Chipko means to “hug or embrace” in Hindi). The Chipko
movement protested neocolonial capitalism, a form of economic structuralism that ravages
resources of the so-called Third World to sell goods in foreign markets. This movement
eventually spread beyond this adivasi community to other areas and became one of India’s most
influential environmental movements. The Chipko movement is classified as a form of the
greening of religion in its frequent use of Hindu scriptures that posit the protection of all forms
31

of life. The movement brought awareness not only to deforestation but also to water
conservation, mining practices, and other industrial influences. The Chipko movement employed

Adivasi is a category constructed by the Indian government meaning “backward Hindus,” who
are viewed as subaltern within caste system. This community is systematically oppressed and
marginalized by the government through law, policy, and economic development. Due to their
place in the social milieu, adivasis in general, and this community in Gopeshwar are/ were
unfairly targeted by development schemes due to their lack of federal protections. See George A.
James, "Ethical and Religious Dimensions of Chipko Movement," in Hinduism and Ecology:
The Intersection of Earth, Sky, and Water, edited by Christopher Chapple and Mary Evelyn
Tucker (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)
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religiosity and/or spirituality in its discourse of environmental activism propelling many to
support its cause.
This consideration of religion and ecology allows us to see how religion, can promote
ecologically minded practice. When considering Hindutva approaches to ecology, however we
must move beyond a “religion and ecology” framework to consider both how Hindu ecologies
are constructed and, as a connected, but somewhat distinct project, how Hindu nationalist
ecologies form.
Hinduism and Ecology
While White’s discussion of religion and ecology begins with Christian doctrine, the
conversation has expanded beyond Christian circles to many world religions to challenge
existing dogmas in light of the ecological problem. Hinduism is, as I have already indicated, not
exempt — is Hinduism eco-friendly? This question essentializes the plurality of Hinduism,
which is a set of multifaceted religious and cultural traditions with distinct regional variations.
The acknowledgement of the plurality of positions and ontologies within “Hinduism” must be
recognized. Therefore, asking this question — “is Hinduism eco-friendly?” — does not elicit a
simple answer. The Chipko movement elucidates an ecologically minded practice in Hinduism,
but pollution of the Ganges, sometimes blatantly overlooked by spiritual leaders stands in
opposition to the proposal that Hinduism is somehow inherently eco-friendly. The answer to the
question is therefore highly contextual. I showcase a few of the ways in which critical analysis,
textual analysis, and ethnographic work has sought to illuminate how Hinduism can be in
conversation with ecological practices.
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In contrast to Western, Judeo-Christian religions, South Asian, East Asian and Native
American traditions have generally been regarded as “inherently more congenial to the
32

environment.” In fact, some scholars have suggested the importation of environmental ethics of
Buddhist and Hindu traditions rather than “Western” traditions, to address the environmental
33

crisis. To draw these binaries between East and West simply essentializes traditions and in the
circumstances of religion and ecology romanticizes and prioritizes so-called Eastern traditions as
more ecologically friendly. The focus of this paper is not to interrogate the degree to which
Hinduism is ecologically friendly, but rather how Hinduism is used as a rhetorical tool to enact
environmental work. In other words, I seek to answer the following question: how is
environmental work implemented using Hindu traditions? Glimpsing into the rich history of
India’s sacred geographies is imperative to understanding how contemporary environmental
movements in India deploy Hindu nationalist rhetoric to codify the landscape.
The transposition of the cultural, religious, and sacred onto physical geographies is not
unique to India as landscapes are vectors of meaning making and spaces of national identity.
However, the relevance of sacred geographies in the Indian context is significant. Diana Eck
argues that, “there is no other major culture that has sustained over so many centuries, and across
34

such diverse regions, a fundamentally locative or place-oriented worldview.” In her book India:
A Sacred Geography (2012), Eck explores the interwoven world of the divine and the physical
world by looking at how the practice of pilgrimage interconnects expansive subcontinental
geographical features through Hindu mythical and ritual imagination. Eck’s analysis focuses on
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the historical constructions of sacred, yet also considers how sacredness is understood in India
today.
Eck introduces her project about the sacred geographies of India by focusing on the River
Ganga, especially as it flows through Banaras, or Varanasi in north India. As a significant
pilgrimage site for many Hindus, Varanasi has often been a city that is compared in its sanctity
and religious preeminence to Mecca, Jerusalem, and Rome — a significant pilgrimage site for
the Hindu traditions. Eck quotes Norman Macleod, a British civil servant in the 1860s who said
of Varanasi that, “I have never seen anything approaching to it as a visible embodiment of
35

religion; nor does anything like it exist on earth.” As Macleod infers, Varanasi becomes
emblematic of how mythological histories are made tangible through the demarcation of sacred
areas, therefore “embodying religion.” This is done through comprising “natural” and
human-made collections of sacred symbols and landscape markers that carry semantic value
resulting in the mapping of mythical, religious worlds onto geographies of the physical world. In
36

what Gavin Flood calls “a projection of sacred reality.”

Varanasi holds a coveted position in the sacred geography of India for a variety of
reasons that include natural features, built environs, and mythic histories that imbue the sense of
sanctity to the land. Known as Kashi, or the City of Light, the city is envisioned as the earthly
manifestation of Shiva’s infinite, luminous sacred emblem, the linga of light. Varanasi is one of
the twelve places throughout the country where the divine light is said to have touched the
37

landscape linking the cosmos to the earth. The presence of the sacred Ganges River, which
Ibid., 2.
Wilbert M. Gesler and Margaret Pierce. "Hindu Varanasi." Geographical Review 90, no. 2
(2000): 222.
37
Eck, India: A Sacred Geography, 10.
35
36

23

marks the eastern boundary of the city is particularly auspicious.38 The Ganga, like other rivers in
India is believed to be a purifying Goddess in liquid form. The mythic history and natural
features of the city have led to the construction of countless man-made sites of worship including
dhams, or abodes of the gods which manifest in the form of shrines. Due to its great religious
auspiciousness, Varanasi is a highly desirable place for pilgrims many of whom believe that by
dying in the city their souls will achieve moksha, or final release from the otherwise repeated
cycle of birth and death (samsara). The sacred dimensions of the landscape are not rendered in
traditional Western maps depicting the landscape, but seen through local histories and religious
narratives and, pilgrimage that have been practiced for centuries.
Under colonialism the mapping of India carried out by British surveyors and
39

cartographers was a form of governing territory and a method of “knowing territory.” This
Western cartographic form of rendering landscape has a very different purpose than that of
imbuing a landscape with mythological, religio-cultural histories. The implementation of British
maps homogenized and took away a crucial dimension of the geographical landscapes by
presenting it through scales, topography, and dots to represent populations and other features
innate to Western mapping practices. In this way, British maps, made invisible any reference to
cultural meaning and memory. More importantly, these maps sought to depict the landscape
through an etic point of view. In short, cartographic mapping practices fail to illuminate the
presence of sacred narratives on the landscape as they transcend the two-dimensional
geographical scale.

More about Ganga and its presence in Hindu scriptures appear later. References to the Ganga
as both a river and a goddess is found in most major Hindu texts (e.g Rig Veda, Mahabharata,
and Valmiki Ramayana) Ibid., 5.
39
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While maps of India today are depicted through Western cartographic methods, the
landscape continues to be imbued with religious meanings, specifically through the language of
sanctification. Sanctification of landscapes is understood as a strategy through which the features
of India’s landscape are established as sacred so that divine presence can be experienced, named,
40

and storied. The land therefore bears traces of the gods and is storied through the constant
re-telling of mythological narratives.41 The landscape therefore connects physical space with the
lore of gods, heroes, and saints which in turn render locations sacred which in turn legitimates
specific geographical features as “sacred.”
The sanctification of the landscape is not done simply by creating boundaries of sacred
and profane spaces based on a certain cultural or religious history. In fact, the notion that
religions separate space into sacred and profane realms is commonly invoked and stems from the
42

work of Mircea Eliade. However, this notion of strict, dichotomous distinctions is not always
clear but often requires a more nuanced, contextualized approach. In India, this distinction is
43

seldom clear as the sacred geography of the city, or land is often in flux. Rather, the land is
subject to both natural and human alterations as the physical landscape acts as a medium for
humans to project meaning onto.
When considering the distinction between Hindu sacred and profane spaces, Varanasi
undoubtedly holds a coveted position as “a model for the entire cosmos” and as a place where
people travel to for pleasure and business as well as for, religious duty and, liberation from
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samsara. But Varanasi does not stand alone, but dwells in relation to the rest of the
subcontinent, and furthermore to the universe. One of Eck’s central claims and realizations in
studying sacred geographies of India is that Varanasi cannot be understood alone, “but only in
the context of a much wider system of meanings in which significance is marked not by
45

uniqueness, but by multiplicity.” This implies a web of connections repeated throughout the
subcontinent in which the sacred is not marked by uniqueness, but by connectedness.46
Eck’s work orients us to the complex layering of Hindu landscapes with key insights into
47

the dynamism and dialectical nature of landscape as a medium for meaning making. David
Haberman, a South Asianist contemporary to Eck, also considers the making of sacred
geographies, focusing on the state of the highly polluted Yamuna, a river that, like the Ganges, is
48

conceptualized as a goddess flowing with liquid love. Haberman moves beyond Eck’s mostly
historical method by approaching the way that the Yamuna-as-Goddess is perceived by devotees
and environmental activists today. Using a religion and ecology framework to explore how the
degradation of the Yamuna is not just an ecological problem but, that it also involves a religious
crisis threatening the divinity of the river.49 As Haberman considers Hindu mythological stories
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and the implications they carry for the landscape, he suggests, in line with his interlocutors in
India that landscapes, can be, and in fact should be, understood through religio-cultural histories
so as to confront environmental problems. I argue are these very same ideas are in fact
redeployed through distinct rhetorical tactics by Hindutva environmental campaigns.
To a certain degree, then, Haberman’s scholarly-activist work might be seen as vaguely
parallel rhetoric of Hindu nationalist ecology as he approaches the “death of the Yamuna”
through a Hindu theological framework. He does this by looking at texts written over many
centuries and by and talking with contemporary practitioners who worship along the river
placing primacy on the Hindu perspective of the river.50 Haberman asserts that the premodern
nature of religion — the ancient texts and mythological stories can be put into dialogue with the
modern reality of environmentalism and politics, which we assume must somehow be secular.
The framework of his ethnography of the Yamuna can be understood as an example of “sacred
modernity.”51
Sacred modernity is a term developed by Tariq Jazeel in his book Sacred Modernity:
Nature, Environment, and the Postcolonial Geographies of Sri Lankan Nationhood (2013) in
which he explores the parallels between Sinhalese Buddhist traditions and the formation of a
Buddhist Nationalist tradition in Sri Lanka. Similar to my analysis of how religio-political Hindu
rhetoric imbues the landscape with particular meaning in India, Jazeel looks at how Buddhism
and its aesthetic and ethnic domains form a critical building block in the formation of the

White’s conceptualization of religion and ecology, but understanding the framework to be
fruitful in studying the Yamuna and the confluence of religious belief and practice and the river.
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post-independent Sri Lankan nationhood. The term sacred modernity suggests a tension between
the premodern roots of certain forms of religious thought and political modernity, which is
52

thought of as a form of secular discourse. The importance of this term is paramount to
understanding how Hindutva environmental movements utilize the trope of India’s “golden age”
and other references to the country’s great past to propel their environmentalist agenda,
suggesting that sacred modernity can be understood in this context as the tension between
contemporary environmentalism, which is often assumed to be secular, with and the pre-modern
discourses of religion.
Bringing together notions of Hindu sacred geographies, which project an imagined Hindu
past and future onto the landscape, and Jazeel’s development of the term sacred modernity, the
Ram Janmabhumi movement illuminates how contemporary Hindu nationalist forces enact
communalist political campaigns rooted in the sacred narratives of a Hindu past. The Ram
Janmabhumi movement — the movement led by Hindu nationalists to build a grand temple for
Lord Ram at his supposed birthplace in Ayodhya by destroying the preexisting Babri Mosque —
illuminates how Hindutva is deployed in terms of claiming particular lands as belonging to
Hindus exclusively. The peak of this movement, still underway today in 2018, took place in
1992, a time referred to as the “saffron wave”53 by scholars of Indian politics because of how
Hindu nationalists steadfastly and with vigor aroused a fervor of Hindu nationalism through
public acts, many of which sought to agitate minorities and assert Hindu dominance. Coinciding
with the increasing displays of Hindu chauvinism was the rise in number of BJP seats in the Lok
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Sabha (India’s Lower Parliament) demonstrating that these government sponsored sectarian
sentiments were being reinforced by a voting public and echoed in the public sphere, making
saffron a favorable color.54
In addition to laying claim to a piece of land, Ram’s supposed birth place, that Hindu
nationalists believed belonged to them alone, the negotiation over Ayodhya as a sacred place is
remembered more as an act of communalism. Before the 1980’s, there were numerous temples
and shrines in Ayodhya that claimed to be the supposed birth place of Ram. Muslims of
Ayodhya lived more or less peacefully along their Hindu neighbors and used the 16th-century
Barbi Mosque as an active place of worship. The Sangh parivar, an extensive network of Hindu
nationalist organizations, carefully raised support for the destruction of the mosque by
organizing people under the banner of kar seva, a term that evokes religiously-motivated
voluntary work that benefits the good of the community.55 Volunteers, or kar sevaks, were seen
as liberating Ram form oppressive foreign rule and returning the supposed “true” and site of the
deity’s birth to the rightful occupiers of the land — Hindus. The final act of demolishing the
Babri Mosque in 1992 was thus enacted against the backdrop of Hindutva rhetoric, which posits
that Hindu tradition and history is not only superior to Islamic tradition and history (which is, of
course, a shared history), but also the only “natural” history of India. Moreover, demolition of
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the Barbri Mosque in Ayodhya is also a physical and violent manifestation of Hindutva ideology
that others and demonizes the non-Hindu, in this case Muslim, as non-citizen and foreign
invader. As an early symbol of the BJP’s rise to power in the Lok Sabha, Ayodhya quickly
became a cultural symbol ingrained in the consciousness of contemporary Hindu nationalist
history, serving as a metonym for the “us” versus “them” rhetoric and political discourse of
Hindutva. This is an example as to how sacred geographies are utilized as political tools to
advance Hindu cultural dominance practices espoused by Hindu nationalist rhetoric.
Unpacking the relationship between religion and ecology, Hindu nationalism, and sacred
geographies are all crucial orienting frameworks in preparing for an analysis of contemporary
environmental movements in India. Sacred geographies are a starting point to understanding how
contemporary environmental campaigns evoke traditional Hindu symbols and stories to arouse
mass Hindu nationalist affection for specific kinds of environmental consciousness. Sacred
geographies play a vital role in the selecting of particular sites for ecological work. In the
following section, I will rely on these orienting frameworks to analyze contemporary
environmental movements in India looking specifically at Hindutva rhetorics and how Hindu
nationalists posit environmentalism as work relevant to the reinvigoration of the nation. These
rhetorics which, I argue, are composed of inherently paternalistic, communalist, and xenophobic
discourses in favor of a Hindu nationalist ecology are deployed by a constitutionally secular
government.
Hindu Nationalism and a Formation of an Environmental Politic
Central to my discussion of contemporary Hindu nationalist ecology is what I suggest are
the essential connections that Hindu nationalists draw between nation, Hindu identity, and the
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“natural” environment. I will elucidate this by looking at government-sponsored campaigns,
which are prime examples of my suggestion that environmentalism in contemporary India can be
carried out in tandem with Hindutva discourse through politicizing the landscapes as inherently
Hindu. Central to this discussion is the development of environmentalism in India as well as the
development of Hindu nationalist ideology in the post-colonial state.
Most of the existing scholarly and journalistic interpretations of environmental work in
India compartmentalize the two — environmental and Hindu nationalism — as distinct.
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However, Mukul Sharma’s work emphasizes the relationality between environmental work and
Hindu nationalist ideologies. I take Sharma’s argument further by positing that Hindutva politics
are manifest in specific visions of not only what it means to be a “Hindu”, but also particular
visions of nature, culture, and contemporary Indian nationhood that intersects with claims to
space and land constructing them through a Hindutva lens.57
Sharma metaphorically interrelates environmental conservation and Hindu politics
58

through his development of the terms “green and saffron.” The term “saffron” carries specific
religious connotations in Hinduism. Similar to imagery that American political parties deploy,
saffron has historically been a symbol of Hindu politics that rely on religious associations.
Many analyses of religion and ecology in the context of Hinduism and India by default begin
with discussions on Vedic and Puranic interpretations of human and nature relationships.
Sharma, as well as myself, believe the importance of Hindu politics, which inherent deploy
Vedic, Brahmanical, and Puranic (textual, traditional) must be central to an analysis of
contemporary forms of environmentalism in India.
57
Sharma brings together environmentalism and Hindu nationalism to articulate how political
ideology rooted in Hindutva ideology and revivalism is deeply influencing environmental
initiatives. He looks at how traditional symbols like “Mother India” are at work in arousing
nationalist sentiments to call for action in ecological work. See Mukul Sharma, Green and
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Saffron functions as an adjective to describe the religiously derived politics affiliated more
recently with policies of right-wing Hindu nationalist parties that posit a vision of Indian
59

nationhood that seeks a return to ancient, or Holy Indian culture and traditions. Many sadhus,
or Hindu renunciants traditionally adorn themselves in the color saffron as it symbolizes
religious devotion. Hindu nationalist groups, since the time of the British Raj have adopted the
color as representative of their Hindutva politics. Now the color holds an authoritative position in
the historical milieu of nationalist discourse and most recently in the discourse of the current
ruling Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, which has co-opted saffron. The color, along with other
symbols that I discuss further, appear everywhere — from their political pamphlets to the kurtas
60

(tunics) worn by politicians belonging to the party.

In order to understand the political and cultural clout of the deployment of “saffron” and
the discourses that inform its construction, further attention to the history of the term Hindutva,
or “Hinduness” is essential. Today, Hindutva is the predominant ideology informing Hindu
nationalism in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the current ruling and largest Hindu
nationalist party is a member of a larger family of organizations adhering to a Hindu nationalist
61

agenda, named the Sangh Parivar. Hindutva is not derived from work of the Sangh Parivar, but
rather has historically informed their work and been co-opted to support contemporary causes.

“Saffronisation” is both an etic and emic term. Political leaders of the BJP use the term to
evoke their goal of returning to the glory days of India, while critics of right-wing policies carry
negative connotations of the term -- i.e communalism, xenophobia.
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The term Hindutva originates from a highly political time of colonial resistance and
Hindu unification against the British Raj. While even in its conception it specified an
exclusionary politics, contemporary deployments of the term are more explicitly grounded in
communalist sentiments.62 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar coined the term in his text Hindutva:
Who is a Hindu? (1924). In the opening chapter, Savarkar explains the complex nature of
Hindutva stating: “Hindutva is not a word but a history. Not only the spiritual or religious history
of our people as at times it is mistaken to be by being confounded with the other cognate term,
Hinduism. Hinduism is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva… Hindutva embraces all
63

the departments of thought and activity of the whole being of our Hindu race.” His main point
here is that the term should not be conflated with Hinduism, but rather should be seen as
encompassing “race” as well as the discursive history of a unified people.
Savarkar’s ideological piece, which he wrote while incarcerated in a colonial prison in
the early 1920s, continues to act as a core principle of Hindu nationalist ideology. The term
Hindutva equates a religious identity with “racial” and national identities in a complex way. In
doing so, it also makes a territorial distinction. Based on a history of space and cultural practices,
Hindutva codifies the land as a territory of a particular people in relation to the geography: “A
Hindu means a person who regards this land of Bharatvarsha, from the Indus to the Seas as his
64

Father-Land as well as his Holy-Land that is the cradle land of his religion.” Savarkar maps

to note here is that when the term was conceived Hindus were under colonial rule of
the Raj. Today, however, Hindus of the BJP hold coveted position of power as the are the ruling
party and utilize this rhetoric to exclude minority communities. In other words, since conception,
those utilizing the term have gone from a position of being under colonial rule to ruling a nation.
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two essential qualifiers of Hindutva: territory and religion.65 In a certain sense, territory and
religion are not discrete, but one in the same as religious narratives draw on mythological
histories on the landscape. Hindutva, however, has come to refer to an essentialized Hindu
cultural, historical, and above all national religious identity, which marks the Hindu People as a
66

whole and as a nation.

The purpose of the term Hindutva, made quite overt by Savarkar, was to construct a
67

national identity as India rose to overturn British imperialism. The inception of the term carried
anti-colonial sentiments: defining the nation as Hindu was a way to unify the majority of the
populace in an effort to mobilize and displace the Raj. However, in doing so his articulation of a
nationalism included a discursive set of qualifiers that constructed a Hindu identity in a way that
places non-Hindu, namely Christian, Muslims, Dalits, and other marginalized groups, outside the
imagined nation. More contemporarily, Hindutva contributes to a majoritarian nationalism that
equates India with Hindu society and seeks to purify culture by cleansing it of those cast as
“foreign.”
Savarkar was a twentieth-century political figure in India who coined the term Hindutva,
but the term and the Hindu pride it captures has been and continues to be espoused in the public

of sacred geographies conceptualize the land as a land naturally belonging to those of
the “Hindu race.”
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sphere. In The Saffron Wave (1999), Thomas Hansen describes the recent rise of Hindu
nationalist discourse. He argues “that Hindu nationalism has emerged and taken shape neither in
the political system as such nor in the religious field, but in the broader realm of what we may
call public culture— the public space in which a society and its constituent individuals and
communities imagine, represent, and recognize themselves through political discourse,
68

commercial and cultural expressions, and representations of state and civic organizations.” In
other words, Hindu nationalism has solidified in public culture through a collective conscious
that is informed by everyday rhetoric coming from religious, political, and cultural sources.
Furthermore, Hindu nationalism cannot be understood as solely being disseminated from
political authorities — it is created bilaterally and dialectically through citizens and government.
Hansen argues that the public identity of the nation has increasingly relied upon the
reinvigoration of Hindutva, which includes xenophobic discourses in the realm of democracy.
The exclusionary nature of Hindutva is now deployed openly, and with great support, in a
multicultural and ostensibly secular nation. It has become a powerful political tool that grants
contemporary politicians a historically backed rhetoric of patriotism and xenophobia. As stated
earlier, the ideology of Hindutva today is located in politics of the BJP, India’s current ruling
party. The BJP is widely seen as representing facets of Hindu communalism and nationalism and
has become the ruling party of India and the major opposition party to Congress, the so-called
secular part of Nehru, Gandhi, and other founding members of India.
More contemporarily, the presence of the BJP in India’s government has crescendoed
since 1989 as the BJP has continued to secure increasing numbers of seats in the Lok Sabha, the
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lower house of India’s parliament and the election of the current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi
in 2014. Prior to his Prime Ministerial position, Modi served as the chief minister of Gujarat.
Under his leadership communal riots engulfed Gujarat in 2002, during which more than 1,000
people, mostly Muslims, were killed. Modi’s and Gujarat’s state forces were accused of
condoning, or doing little to put combat communal violence. This incident, which is linked to the
violence that erupted around the controversy, serve as yet another violent example of Hindu
nationalist phenomenon that the BJP has not contested, nor condemned.
The ideology of Hindutva is pervading India society in other, less violent ways. For
example, in January 2017 Modi assembled a committee of scholars in New Delhi and tasked
them with rewriting the history of the nation. Using DNA evidence, archaeological findings, and
other material evidence, the task force, under the guise of the BJP, is setting out to prove that the
Hindus living on the subcontinent today are direct descendants of the first inhabitants of the land
mass and not of a lineage that was introduced through conquest or migration.69 The purpose of
constructing this narrative of Hindu indigeneity and cultural supremacy is to challenge a
narrative of secularity, multiplicity, and pluralism that was central to the early architecture of the
Indian nation in 1947 and to posit Indian culture as being synonymous with Hindu culture.70 The
cohort of scholars involved in this project are working overtly in the public sphere through
educational reforms and changing narratives to posit the cultural supremacy of Hinduism which

Julius Lipner, "On Hinduism and Hinduisms: The Way of the Banyan." In Hindu World,
edited by Mittal, Sushil and Gene Thursby. 1st ed. (London: Routledge Ltd, 2004)
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India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, promoted a secular and tolerant state that did
not conflate Indian identity with Hindu identity and the inverse. He said “it was (and is) entirely
misleading to refer to Indian cultural as Hindu cultural.” Rupam Jain and Tom Lasseter, "By
Rewriting History, Hindu Nationalists Aim to Assert their Dominance Over India." Reuters,
March 6, 2018.
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also demarcates non-Hindus as not as integral to, and in fact a danger to, the nation. This method
of rewriting history is one of a plethora of examples of how under Modi’s stewardship the BJP
has elevated Hindu importance over the importance of other religious groups.
The claim of indigeneity ties the Hindu people to the soil of the subcontinent. Because
the land plays an important role in many Hindu histories and scriptures (e.g., Mahabharata epic
and the Puranas71), contemporary Hindutva discourse often claims that today’s Hindus are direct
descendants of the authors of these texts.72 Texts and land exist in a reciprocal relationship in
which Hindu scriptures are read as empirical evidence to support Hindu nationalist
understandings of the land and their indigeneity to the subcontinent — acting as a form of
sacred legitimization to their claims.73 The relationship linking territory to Hindu traditions is the
basis of Savarkar’s formulation of Hindutva. The political agenda of the BJP is highly influenced
by its goals to remake Indian society, history, polity, and ecology though the reinvigoration of
Hindu identity to the land of India. Also key to how the BJP and its allies are carrying out these
political goals is through laying claim to certain elements of the landscape that carry significant

example, in the Bhagavata Purana, recounts one of the many tales of the river Ganga
stating that: “Vishnu’s large toe scratches a hole in the cosmic egg, releasing Ganga. The river
washes the dirt from Vishnu’s foot before descending to earth, where she then washes away the
sins of humanity and purifies the entire world.” This Puranic narrative illustrates a Hindu
cosmology, linking Hindu scripture to the natural landforms of the subcontinent. References to
the Ganga as both a river and a goddess is found in most major Hindu texts (e.g Rig Veda,
Mahabharata, and Valmiki Ramayana) See Kedzior, "Ganga: The Benevolent Purifier Under
Siege,” 23.
72
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Meera Nanda. "Postmodernism, Hindu Nationalism, and “Vedic Science”, Scientific Values
and Civic Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 201-235. Nanda’s argument is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it investigates the development of a Hindu science that is
seen by the author as a “reactionary modernity.” The crucial conceptual work to take from Nanda
is that this Hindu nationalist science, which has been a source of much social oppression
throughout India’s history, draws upon upper-caste, Brahmanical sacred books to create
authority in many realms of Indian life, one of them being environmental thought.
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cultural, mythical, and religious significance to Hindus. In the realm of environmentalism,
Hindutva ideology is utilized to motivate and orient contemporary environmental work in India.
Returning to Mukul Sharma’s use of saffron, “the saffron wave” is metonymic of the
raise of the Hindu nationalism, namely the BJP and its Hindutva ideology since its inception in
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1980. Sharma puts saffron in dialectic with green (read: environmentalism) to explore the
polyvalent layers of religion and ecology as it manifests in contemporary Indian political
campaigns for environmental restoration and conservation. Green and saffron transfer the
location of environmental work from a secular space to a religiously coded and factional space.
In one way, I see the use of Hindu ideology as a political tool to support environmental causes
particularly helpful to environmental work because it contextualizes, makes urgent, and
politicizes an issue that may otherwise receive scant attention from the general public.
Simultaneously, the sectarian and communalism sentiments central to Hindutva rhetoric around
environmental work is divisive and exploitative of religious dogma for the ends of environmental
work that supports a particular idea of Indian nationhood. Additionally, it brings to question the
true intentions of this environmental work: is it to serve a religious nationalist agenda or to
ameliorate landscapes impacted by anthropogenic climate change, or both?
The terms green and saffron stand in for Hindu nationalist environmental politics and
exist in relation to one another in different ways. Green and saffron work dialectically with one
another. The “Greening of Saffron” is the mission of Hindu nationalists to include environmental
75

conservation and restoration into their political platform. Here, environmentalism is overtly

Politics are distinct from religiosity when it comes to the term “saffron.” It is symbolic of the
political dimensions of Hindutva. See Hansen, The Saffron Wave.
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Since the 1980’s Hindu communal forces have joined in environmental activities and shown
support for environmental movements throughout the country. Ibid., 13.
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political through the use of religious dogma as it is deployed as a means to an end for
environmental work. Sharma argues that Hindu religious dharma and activities are often
76

exploited for political purposes by Hindu communal organizations. The concerns of Hindutva
environmental politics draw on glorifications of Hindu sacred geographies — landmarks and
cities (e.g Ayodhya), rivers (e.g Yamuna and Ganga), forests, and pilgrimage sites (e.g Varanasi)
— framing calls for environmental protection in terms of a religious obligation for Hindus.
The movements of contemporary Hindu nationalist environmentalism manifest in the
protection of the material conditions of the natural world, however the layered meaning of this
environmental work is much more complex. Harking back to V.D. Savarkar’s development of
Hindutva as a national identity that posits a particular view of Indian nationhood Hindu
nationalist ecological efforts are highly informs and constructed around communalist sentiment.
The term pollution is central to these sentiments. Pollution in modern environmental discourse
relates to the material impurity of a space, be it the effluence of a factory in a river, or the
presence of plastic debris in a forest. In this particular manifestation of right-wing
environmentalism, pollution is additionally understood as the degradation of the natural, cultural
and historical worlds by unwanted, outside forces that impinge upon the authenticity and
singularity, and purity of the nation. This discourse of pollution serves to reify the distinction
between that which is “natural” and “native” from that which is “imported” and “new.” Such a
discourse serves to restore Hindus as “natural” and Islam, Christianity, and others as polluting to
the nation. Pollution takes on this dual meaning of both cultural and material purity, allowing
for the conflation of environmental work and xenophobia.

Ibid., 12.
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The Sangh Parivar, or the “saffron brigade” has taken up this notion of
purity-and-pollution, using environmentalism as a vehicle for larger socio-political goals of
creating a Hindu nation. Their formulation codifies certain socio-religious groups as “clean” if
they contribute to the dynamic goal of Hindu nationalism, while those in perceived opposition to
this goal rendered as impure and polluting others. In other words, the cleaning of material
pollution links environmental purity with social and cultural purity. Sharma postulates that
environmentalism is a tangible manifestation that furthers Hindutva ideology by ridding of, in a
very literal sense, that which is unwanted. Swami Chinmayanand, a BJP member who actively
campaigns for environmental causes claims that, “environmental issues and concerns are nothing
new for the BJP… The sanctity and sacredness of our environment is closely related with the
77

sanctity of our culture.” Concern for ecological pollution and social pollution parallel each
other in Hindu nationalist rhetorics, which aim for a restoration of a mythical “golden age” of
ancient India (specifically before the introduction of Islam to the subcontinent), and seeks to
valorize the landscape as unique and central to national identity.
Indian nationalism derives much of its meaning from two discourses central to this topic:
religious identity and natural landscape. Hindutva politics has been theorized and studied by
78

scholar Peter Van Der Veer in terms of Indian “religious nationalisms” more broadly. Peter
Van Der Veer’s theory of religious nationalism is as follows:
... (1) that religious identity is constructed in ritual discourse and practice; (2) that these
identities are not ‘primordial attachments’ inculcated by unchanging traditions, but
specific products of changing forms of religious organization and communication; (3)
that religious nationalism articulates discourse on the religious community and discourse
Interview from Mukul Sharma with Swami Chinmayanand in Haridwar, 26 July 2000. See
Sharma, Green and Saffron, 53.
78
Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Delhi [u.a.]: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. xi.
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on the nation; and (4) that Hindu and Muslim nationalism develop along similar lines and
79
that one needs the other.
Van Der Veer’s definition of religious nationalism, which speaks to the shared practice of ritual
as a core unifying identity, clearly speaks to the ideology espoused by Savarkar and by more
contemporary Hindutva voices in that it speaks to the shared practice of ritual and practice
80

amongst a community as a core unifying identity. If current right-wing Hindu nationalist
politics can be understood as a form of religious nationalism, which I argue it can be, then it
must be considered how this nationalism informed by Hindutva contributes to contemporary
environmental politics.
Along with the aforementioned criteria criteria of religious nationalism, Van Der Veer
81

writes that, “the definition of space and territory are central elements of religious nationalism”.
National landscapes are imagined to be unique and formative to identity, acting as a national

symbol that prescribe meaning through history and culture. A nation forms its narrative around
its natural features, climate, and environment and takes immense pride in these features, often
valorizing them through cultural and historical recognition.
Eco-Nationalism, or the importance of natural landscape in the discursive construction of
a nation, influences historical and cultural understandings of the nation and is vital in the
82

development of the religious nationalism of India. Given the centrality of the landscape to the
development of Hindu traditions, India is a particularly strong example of religious nationalists

Ibid., xii.
Savarkar says of Hindutva: “Hindutva is not a word but a history. Not only the spiritual or
religious history of our people as at times it is mistaken to be by being.” See Savarkar, Hindutva,
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claims to territory. The sacred geographies of India, from the Himalayas in the north to its sacred
rivers, are reified in Hindu texts, ritual practices, and political and popular narratives that
demarcate the land of the subcontinent as belonging to Hindus. The importance of physical
landscape roots Hindu nationalist ideas of the nation in the ecology of the territory codifying the
idea of a nation through both religious and environmental frameworks. In this way, Hindu
religious nationalism in India is seen both as an attachment to a storied landscape, as articulated
by Diana Eck, as well as the attributes of shared ritual practice, and community as articulated by
Van der Veer’s theoretical development of religious nationalism.
Hindu nationalism is not a new phenomenon. The idea that Hindus are rooted around a
particular culture and identity that takes a central role in defining the Indian nation dates back to
the nineteenth century when Hindus organized to defy the British Raj. Furthermore, the
connection between the Indian subcontinent and the certain groups of people (now called Hindu,
namely Brahmins and other high caste Hindus) as indigenous to it dates back millennia.
However, the advent of a Hindutva framed environmentalism is novel and a product of
modernity. Hindu national ecology has found its voice in the resurgence of conservative
right-wing leaders. In the next and final section, I consider the greening of saffron through
products of the BJP, namely the BJP’s 2014 Manifesto and the Namami Ganga task force.
The Greening of Saffron: Contemporary Environmentalism in India
As the second most populous nation in the world with rapidly expanding infrastructure,
India faces a lot of scrutiny from the international community in regards to climate policy. India
has the difficult task of balancing two sometimes conflicting principles: exploitation of natural
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resources and economic growth. India’s balance of the two has proven to be of paramount
relevance to the rest of the world, given the country’s sheer size and burgeoning position as a
global player. Though India is working to confront this balancing act of economic and ecological
sustainability in a myriad of ways, the efforts of the BJP are particularly relevant. Led by
Narendra Modi, this right-wing party has taken up the ecological question through a Hindu
nationalist and communal framework that has significantly impacted the country’s ecological
consciousness. In other words, environmentalism or “being green” is put into conversation with
Hindu nationalist projects mixing the “green” of environmentalism with “saffron.”
The BJP has been criticized by the international community for prioritizing economic
growth over environmental concerns, as Modi’s policy favors business interest over the
environment in many ways.83 Despite these issues, the political platform of the BJP addresses
environmental concern. The 2014 BJP Election Manifesto itself includes a section devoted to
environmental care, suggesting that the issue does hold a place of significance in the party’s
84

platform. However, the language in the environmental section of the election manifesto is
steeped in “saffron” rhetoric, drawing from traditional Hindu symbols such as the lotus flower, a
symbol associated with purity, and with images of Hindu deities, whose bodies are imagined as
the nation itself. The use of such symbols raises the question of whether or not the party’s

A quick glance at the 2014 BJP Manifesto makes this clear as 14 sections are dedicated to
business practices / economy and 4 are dedicated to environmental or ecological concern. See
Sabka Saath and Sabka Vikas, BJP Election Manifesto, accessed March 2, 2018.
https://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf. A sociological
post-materialist argument could be made to state that given the lack of basic infrastructure for
portions of the India population, environmentalism cannot be addressed until basic human
concerns are satisfied.
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environmental aspirations are rooted in a legitimate desire to heal ecosystems or are being
deployed as means to assert Hindu dominance. As I show, it seems that the BJP is more
interested in furthering Hindutva revivalist rhetoric in order to continue the cultural heritage of
85

Hindu Indian society that it is in “cleaning” up the environment.

The BJP manifesto pledges to clean the Ganga, and in doing so it refers to the river as “a
symbol of faith in India” that “has a special place in the Indian psyche,” which suggests a
multiplicity of meanings beyond ecological restoration placing a primacy on cultural
86

significance. It brings depth to the ecological problem of modernity and positions religious and
cultural concerns as crucial. Under the guise of Hindutva, the contamination of the Ganga is a
multivalent phenomenon not just about political ecology, but about religion as well and the need
to infuse religion and political ecology as interrelated forms of analysis. For devotees, the Ganga
holds unparalleled spiritual significance as residents living along the Ganga exclaim: “Ganga is
our most valuable heritage… We are very grateful to Mother. Out of her purity, we become pure
every day.”87 For these people, just as for those discussed in Haberman’s ethnography about the
Yamuna, the pollution and ecological devastation to the river threaten the liquid goddess.88

While these two may not be mutually exclusive, the implications of carrying out the
environmental work as a means to advance a political agenda and exclude Dalits, Westerns, and
Muslim, (or largely those understood as “Other”) complicates how this work is viewed. Later on
I will further delineate how I see two campaigns approaching the ecological question through
both genuine desires to ameliorate the landscape and as methods to advance Hindutva ideology.
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Georgina Drew. River Dialogues : Hindu Faith and the Political Ecology of Dams on the
Sacred Ganga (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2017), 23.
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A major concern beyond pollution for those who worship along the Ganga is the development
of dams for hydroelectric power. In Drew’s book, she performs an ethnographic project in the
Uttarakhand state along a stretch of the Ganga speaking with practitioners and deploying a
political ecology and religious studies framework to make a core conceptual argument that
“political ecology requires more religiously attuned analyses, especially in cases when resources
are revered”. Drew, River Dialogues, 6.
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The BJP manifesto reiterates the relationship between ecological conservation and
cultural purity. The section on the Ganga is listed under “cultural heritage” in the party’s
89

manifesto instead of under “environment and pollution.” Such a spiritual framing of an
environmental problem creates concern about the party’s selective choice of natural resource
protection. It suggests that natural resources that have spiritual significance for Hindus are
prioritized, while those without spiritual connotations are given inadequate attention. These
conservation priorities that favor sacred features of the landscape demonstrate the interplay
between environmentalism and Hindu nationalist rhetoric.90
In the BJP’s manifesto, the “Cultural Heritage” section contains a short list of goals all of
which speak to the a shared culture of a glorified Hindu past and a therefore a therefore Hindu
91

future. In the case of environmentalism, Hindutva’s political ideology is often articulated by
weaving environmental issues into popular discourses that posit the idea of a pure India, as an
India composed of Hindus. This is, as Sharma says, another example of how “environmental

Ibid., 6.
efficacy of cleaning the Ganga is up to debate. However, the fact that it is given the space
in the party’s manifesto demonstrates some interest in addressing the concerns of the river,
whether the intentions are to actually clean it, I argue is questionable. A commonly discussed
environmental problem in India is that of air pollution, especially in large urban areas. India has
been critiqued, quite harshly, by international bodies regarding air quality. It is important to note
that a discussion of air quality is minimal in the manifesto, which I argue is because there are
little direct connections between air quality and sacred Hindu geographies.
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The “Cultural Heritage” section of the BJP Manifesto is the final section of the manifesto and
the agenda items are overtly in the vein of Hindu nationalism. The first item on the short list is
“Ram Mandir: BJP reiterates its stand to explore all possibilities within the framework of the
constitution to facilitate the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya.” This first action item
is an extension of the Rath Ram Yatra, a 1990 an overtly and violent Hindu nationalist
religious-political march touring a majority of the subcontinent which ended in the destruction of
the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya as Hindus claimed it was the birthplace of the Hindu deity Rama.
This march was an example of communalistic, possessive land practices that derived from claims
to sacred geographies.
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terms tie in nicely with the religious repertoire of sanitation, pollution, sacredness, purity, and
purification” allowing right-wing environmental activities to be deployed in tandem, or as a part
92

of everyday Hindutva discourses.

This pattern moves beyond text and can be seen in the BJP’s policies, too. Starting when
he began representing the BJP as Prime Minister in May 2014, Modi has enacted various policies
specific to the environment (Namami Ganga campaign and the Ram Setu campaign93, to name
two) through the paradigm of the greening of saffron. As is reflected in the manifesto, these
environmental policies are conceptualized as matters of cultural heritage, or “the legacy of
tangible and intangible attributes of a group or society that are inherited from past generations
94

and maintained in the present, bestowed for the benefit of future generations.” The use of the
term “cultural heritage” when thought of in terms of the heritage of a particular group, in this
case those identifying as “Hindu”, in a diverse society carries a rich communalist narrative
creating a hierarchy of cultural heritages.95

Sharma, Green and Saffron 13.
The Ram Setu campaign is another campaign listed in the “Cultural Heritage” section of the
BJP manifesto. Akin to Namami Ganga, it seeks to protect a “natural feature” due to its
mythological significance to a Hindu identity. The significance being that the stretch of land
between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka was a bridge constructed by Lord Ram’s monkey army, a
story found in the Ramayana. The policy states: Ram Setu is a part of our cultural heritage and
also of strategic importance due to its vast thorium deposits. These facts will be taken into
consideration while taking any decision on 'Sethu Samudram Channel' project.” See Saath, BJP
Election Manifesto, 41.
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2018.
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A final example of the reliance on “cultural heritage” narratives is apparent in National
Mission for Clean Ganga campaign “Namami Ganga.” In an informational video introducing the
campaign, the video opens with a capture of a sadhu (Hindu ascetic) dunking himself in the
sacred water of the Ganges accompanied by the voice of a disembodied narrator saying “Who
says, you are just a river? You are my mother, father, teacher and provider. You are the home to
96

my soul.” The narration throughout gestures to the manifestation of a goddess in the form of a
river by referencing to the river as a subject. The video continues to invoke a deep Hindutva
rhetoric to frame the urgent need to clean the Ganges, thus reflecting the importance of cultural
97

heritage over the concern for ecological amelioration. There is little to no discussion regarding
how human health or biological functions of the ecosystem are in danger, but reiterates a
narrative of purifying the sacred.
The informational video introduces the spectators to Modi’s new council Namami Gange:
Integrated Ganga Conservation Mission. Namami Gange furthers the cultural heritage narrative
by depicting the Ganges as a goddess in danger. The National Mission for Clean Ganga is a
newly formed sector of the government formed by Modi. The mission is to rejuvenate the
98

Ganges, calling “ardent and devoted followers of Ma Ganga” to take part in the campaign. The
video is steeped in Hindu imagery, yet it asks all “Indians” to take part in the campaign, thus
conflating “Indian” with Hindu.

“Ganga Documentary Video, Presented by PM Modi and Madison Square.” Youtube video,
6:24, from a televised speech by PM Modi on September 29, 2014, posted by “Vaibhav
Gautam,” September 29, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6einDrt9Vwk.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
96

47

The Namami Gange is exemplary of the greening of saffron. The BJP (saffron) has
created a new sector to address ecological concerns (green). In Hindi “namāmi gaṅge” is a form
of pseudo-Sanskrit that means “I bow to you O Ganga.”99 Linguistically, the name of the
campaign conceptualizes the concern of the Ganga through religiosity as a divine source that
must be bowed to, praised in order to be rejuvenated on multiple levels. In the Namami Gange
campaign, the Ganga is referred to as “the most worshipped yet the most neglected river” which
gestures to the impetus to purify the sacred and the paradox of an impure sacrality.
The tension between material and cultural pollution is brought into question here as the
pollution of the Ganga carries a multiplicity of implications, the two of primary relevance being
the Ganga as a source of subsistence and the Ganga as an embodiment of spiritual significance
and purity. Firstly, the pollution of the Ganga endangers the viability of the water source as a
lifeline for the estimated four hundred million living in proximity to the Ganga and relying on it
as a source of water.100 Secondly, the Ganga is a foremost source of ritual purity in the Hindu
tradition and as the river becomes increasingly polluted with effluence it brings into question if
the sacred can be become impure from material pollution and what significance the pollution has
on the practice of ritual and reverence of the river. She, Ganga the goddess embodied in the river,
is credited with bringing life to the plains of India, where her waters nourish crops, and where
she bears the power to purify physical and spiritual maladies.
Given the Hindutva approach of the Namami Gange campaign and the significance of the
Ganga as a Hindu cultural symbol the pollution of the Ganga, I argue, that the Ganga can be seen

Translation and interpretation credited to Professor Emilia Bachrach.
Janak Rogers. "India's Polluted Ganges River Threatens People's Livelihoods." Deutsche
Well, November 21, 2013.
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as a metonym of the pollution to the imagined Hindu nation. Again, referred to as “a symbol of
faith and heritage”101 in peril, the Namami campaign seeks to “restore the pride, beauty, and lost
glory.”102 The use of the phrase “lost glory” evokes a nationalist and revivalist desire to return
back to the Golden Vedic age that lies at the center of Hindutva ideology, an idea of Hindu
supremacy. As environmental and religious and cultural ideas become conflated, the desire to
return to a past signifies that in the past the river was clean and the nation was Hindu. The
“otherness” that has polluted the river and the nation are named as Western influences (colonial
forces, industrialization, the presence of Islam and Christianity) all of which have dirtied the
river in a material way and therefore a spiritual way as a stain on the imagined Hindu nation.
Given this, efforts to clean the river come with implications of cleaning society as well.
In the case of the Namami Gange campaign, the BJP approaches what many would
consider an ecological concern with a focus on national conservatism, or the upholding of
cultural and ethnic identity, mixing “green” with “saffron” to make a interwoven tapestry of
green and saffron in which either metaphorical color is impossible to isolate from the other.
Intertwining the sacred cultural heritage of the Ganga as Goddess with a pressing concern of
modernity— ecological awareness, has driven the formation of a regional form of sacred
modernity in which historical Hindu cultural stories become central to understanding and
confronting quandaries of the twenty-first century.
Conclusion
The instances of Hindu nationalism that generate attention in public discourse are those
of electoral gains, or instances of communal violence akin to Ayodhya and the Gujarat riots.
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Ibid., 1:48.
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However, the pervasive nature of Hindu nationalism is present in seemingly ubiquitous ways.
While environmentalism may traditionally evoke ideas of the contemplation of nature, or
restoration of habitats, often seen as universally beneficial outcomes, environmentalism can take
a plethora of forms. The manner in which the BJP has taken up the ecological question through
an overtly Hindutva framework acts as an extension of the Hindu nationalist agenda of creating
Hindu cultural supremacy. The greening of saffron presents a form of environmentalism that
relies on ideas of Hindutva by drawing on sacred Hindu traditions and furthermore normative
visions of the nation as methods for ameliorating environmental degradation.
In efforts to purify the sacred, pollution carries a multiplicity of meanings — as a
material fact and as a hindrance to the socio-cultural idea of India as a Hindu nation. In this way,
Indian environmentalism is being reshaped by the development of a Hindu nationalist ecology as
a method of furthering a Hindutva agenda upon a heterogenous voting public, constitutionally
secular, and religiously diverse nation. Within India the implications of this are immense. If
Hindu nationalism can find its voice in the realm of environmental work, it is bound to pervade
in other ways to mark the nation as one that is distinctly Hindu. Moreover, the development of a
Hindutva environmental politic raises the important question of how secular environmental
activism in India relates to the coalescing of green and saffron and furthermore, how and if, the
BJP will address climate concerns that do not threaten the idealized Hindu nation.
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Coda
A large body of evidence to support my thesis falls outside of the core theoretical scope
of my argumentative structure which focuses on analyzing political discourse and rhetoric tools.
I omitted a section from the “The Greening of Saffron and the Saffronisation of Green:
Contemporary Environmentalism in India” and placed it in the coda. While I find it crucial to my
argument, it relies on a whole body of methodological literature, namely that of visual analysis,
that is not mentioned elsewhere in the capstone. To properly analyze the video of Modi in New
York (and other visual sources that would support my argument) would require a methodology
of visual analysis which is beyond the scope of this project. If this project is revisited, a more
explicit section would address visual analysis as the use of visual symbols and semiotics is used
often in Hindu nationalist discourse.
Hindu nationalist ecological thought is articulated beyond the page and can be observed
in Prime Minister Modi’s speeches. In September 28, 2014 the newly elected Prime Minister
Modi spoke at Madison Square Garden in New York, attracting 19,000 fans, mostly from the
103

diaspora community, to the arena to hear him speak in Hindi about India.

After hours of

performance by Indian actors, singers, artists and promotional videos describing the BJP’s
platform, Modi, adorned in a saffron and yellow kurta entered the arena causing a fanfare
amongst the crowd. Modi stoically approached the microphone and in a reserved tone said

PM Modi almost exclusively delivers public speeches in Hindi and a very Sanskritized
register of Hindi which is a strategic linguistic nation building move. His use of Sanskritized
Hindi, a language affiliated with Hindu teachings and ancient Hindu pasts. Thanks to Emilia
Bachrach for clueing me into Modi’s language conventions and how it ties to the Hindu
nationalist agenda.
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“Bharat mata ki” and the crowd responded with intensity “jai!”104 The chant, “Bharat mata ki jai”
meaning “Victory for Mother India” evokes India as a national personification of goddess,
namely a Hindu goddess which carries a communalist semantic.105
Modi is surrounded by saffron and green flora, Modi embodied India sartorially in his
saffron signature Modi kurta and spoke admirably about India to a large diaspora as a form of
soft power.

106

The fanfare of the event would lead an unaware viewer to believe that Modi was in

fact not a politician, but an international celebrity of high reverence. Towards the end of his
speech, after white, saffron, and green balloons descend from the ceiling, the announcer diverts
the exuberant crowd’s attention from Modi to one of the megatrons in the arena, which begins to
play a video in English about the state of the Ganges River, which also deploys Hindu imagery in
very overt ways. (See p. 47 of capstone to see where this conversation continues)

“PM Modi’s address at Madison Square Garden,” YouTube video, 1:31:32, from a speech at
Madison Square Garden in New York, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZ4jbh-SsHc.
105
This term is met with consternation by Muslim politicians and some that are a part of the
Muslim minority. Seema Chishti, “A Mother’s worship: Why some Muslims find it difficult to
say ‘Bharat Mata ki jai’,” The Indian Express, November 1, 2017.
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Modi is overwhelming admired by diasporic communities. His speech at Madison Square
Garden resulted in over 60,000 requests for free tickets with a capacity of only 19,000 people.
The election of Modi, as a Hindu nationalist, has revived a lot of pride in India among diasporic
communities around the globe. Additionally, diaspora who support the BJP contribute large sums
of money and are a huge source of funding and support for Modi. See Shreeta Sinha, "Indian
Leader Narendra Modi, Once Unwelcome in U.S., Gets Rock Star Reception," New York Times,
September 27, 2014.
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